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This article challenges evolutionary accounts of property transfor­
mation in postcommunist Hungary, which hold that novel property 
forms based on interenterprise ownership have emerged in that 
country. It shows that private property has emerged as the predom­
inant category of ownership in Hungary and explains the rapid 
diffusion of private ownership by focusing on the actions of the state 
and international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Union. Following the collapse of communism, 
state actors in Hungary promoted the domestic accumulation of 
capital by subsidizing the sale of state enterprises to private parties, 
particularly enterprise insiders. Pressures from international agen­
cies ultimately forced government officials to abandon this policy, 
however, and to conform to a neoliberal model of the state that 
allowed direct foreign investment. The conclusion considers the ca­
pacity of states to intervene in economic processes in an environment 
increasingly dominated by suprastate agencies. 
Among sociologists studying Eastern Europe there has been a marked 
reluctance to label economic change in the region as a "transition to 
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capitalism." Instead, researchers have preferred to describe developments 
in the region in terms of evolutionary models that stress organizational 
inertia and continuity with preexisting institutional forms.2 Such "path 
dependent" approaches highlight the manner in which local actors, as a 
result of their tendency to resort to familiar routines and practices, re­
produce institutions that date back to the state-socialist period (Murrell 
1992; Poznanski 1995). Extending the evolutionary approach to the arena 
of property rights, David Stark (1996) has argued that the managers of 
state-owned enterprises in Hungary have institutionalized the relations 
of reciprocity that linked firms during the communist period by estab­
lishing networks of institutional cross-ownership, thereby creating a form 
of "recombinant property" that blurs the traditional distinction between 
state and private ownership.3 Echoing a theme frequently invoked by 
economic sociologists today, Stark maintains that interenterprise owner­
ship has given rise to forms of e conomic coordination based as much on 
reciprocity as competition. Much of the scholarly community has fallen 
in line behind Stark, accepting the claim that reliance on preexisting 
routines and practices on the part of local economic actors has resulted 
in the persistence of organizational forms and institutional practices dating 
from the state-socialist period (Nielsen, Jessop, and Hausner 1995; Camp­
bell and Pedersen 1996; Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsend 1998; Smith and 
Pickles 1998). 
Despite the support the recombinant property thesis has received within 
academic circles, we argue that it is empirically incorrect. Focusing on 
property transformations in Hungary, we will show that the collapse of 
state socialism in that country has not given rise to hybrid property forms 
based on institutional cross-ownership. On the contrary, over the past 10 
years that country has witnessed the rapid diffusion of private ownership 
rights. Two developments in particular underlie the transformation of the 
ownership structure in Hungary; the subsidized sale of state-owned en­
terprises to domestic parties and the inflow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Taken together, these developments have placed ownership of a 
large majority of enterprises in the hands of clearly identifiable private 
parties. 
2 B y institutions we mean the rules that provide the framework in which social action 
takes place. This definition covers not only laws and formal rules but also informal 
constraints such as conventions and norms of behavior. Organizations, by contrast, 
refers to groups created to pursue definite goals. 
3 P roperty rights refer to the rules that define ownership and control of the means of 
production. Following a number of researchers, we argue that property rights should 
be conceived as a bundle of distinctive claims pertaining to the right to control the 
use to which a given set of assets are put, the right to dispose of the income generated 
by these assets, and the right to transfer these assets. 
130 
Postcommunist Hungary 
In this article, we develop a theoretical perspective that provides in­
sights into the processes whereby domestic and foreign parties have ac­
quired ownership rights over productive assets in Hungary. Drawing on 
insights from comparative political economy, we explain the diffusion of 
private ownership rights in Hungary, and in particular the distribution 
of t hese rights between foreign and domestic parties, in terms of a contest 
between the state and international agencies over the course of economic 
development. As is the case in most developing countries, state actors in 
Hungary were structurally constrained by their dependence on foreign 
capital. Taking advantage of this structural dependence, international 
agencies progressively forced government officials to conform to a neo-
liberal model of the state that ruled out reliance on the traditional modes 
of intervention into economic processes and, more specifically, eliminated 
barriers to FDI in key sectors of the Hungarian economy. Despite con­
straints imposed by external agencies, however, the state has continued 
to play an important role in shaping economic developments in Hungary, 
in large part through the allocation of property rights. State actors in 
Hungary, we argue, had an interest in promoting the domestic accumu­
lation of capital, which led them to engage in a number of "property rights 
actions" (Campbell and Lindberg 1990) that explicitly favored national 
elites at the expense of foreign multinationals. Even though external pres­
sures did eventually force government officials in Hungary to jettison 
many instruments of economic intervention, state actors in that country 
nevertheless retained considerable capacity to shape economic develop­
ments as a result of their power to allocate ownership rights over pro­
ductive assets. 
Our emphasis on the capacity of state actors to influence economic 
development even in the face of countervailing pressures is very much in 
line with contemporary discussions of the developmental state. We focus, 
however, on a dimension of state capacity that has received little attention 
in this literature, namely the ability of officials in postcommunist states 
to use their power to allocate ownership rights over economic assets to 
further developmental goals. Most studies of postcommunist Eastern Eu­
rope, even those conducted by researchers within the developmental state 
camp, stress the manner in which integration into global and regional 
markets has diminished the regulatory autonomy of postcommunist states 
(Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Taylor 1994; Gowan 1995). What these stud­
ies have failed to note, however, is that the very requirement to privatize 
state enterprises has enhanced the capacities of postcommunist states in 
new ways. By focusing on the property rights actions of government 
officials, we hope to show that state actors in Hungary played an im­
portant role in fashioning that country's integration into the world econ­
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omy despite the constraints imposed by international agencies and foreign 
capital. 
THE RECOMBINANT PROPERTY THESIS 
Among researchers studying economic transformation in Hungary, the 
general consensus has been that privatization in the postcommunist period 
has taken place in an environment characterized by weak ownership rights 
on the part of state actors and strong ownership rights on the part of 
enterprise insiders. Those who support this interpretation tend to highlight 
the following developments (Voszka 1993, 1995; Canning and Hare 1994): 
1. the adoption of the New Economic Mechanism in 1968, which 
abolished central plan targets and removed price controls from a 
broad range of goods and services; 
2. passage of the 1984 Law on Enterprise Self-Governance, which 
placed two-thirds of Hungarian firms under the control of enterprise 
councils dominated by management; 
3. the implementation of 1988 Company Law and the 1989 Trans­
formation Law, which, taken together, permitted the conversion of 
state enterprises into joint-stock companies and the transfer of up 
to 20% of the shares of converted enterprises to insiders at dis­
counted prices; 
4. the collapse of state socialism, which resulted in the disappearance 
of the mechanisms the state had used to assert property rights—the 
central planning apparatus and the party hierarchy; and 
5. the adoption on the part of the first postcommunist government of 
Josef Antall of a decentralized approach toward privatization that 
transferred the authority to develop privatization proposals to en­
terprise directors themselves. 
Developments such as these have convinced many observers that the 
postcommunist state has been unable to administer assets formally under 
its control (Crane 1991; Frydman, Murphy, and Rapaczynski 1996). 
Stark's (1996) recombinant property thesis retains the idea that the 
collapse of state socialism left de facto ownership rights over state-owned 
firms in the hands of enterprise directors. Rather than argue that enterprise 
directors have been able to give their de facto rights a de jure form, 
however, Stark maintains that they opted for another arrange­
ment—institutional cross-ownership—which allowed them to retain ef­
fective control over economic assets while enjoying a number of additional 
advantages. According to Stark, the "corporatization" of state enterprises, 
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that is, their transformation into limited-liability or joint-stock companies, 
has not given rise to genuine privatization. Instead, the shares of cor-
poratized enterprises were acquired for the most part by other enterprises, 
often those upstream to or downstream from a given firm; this practice 
resulted in the emergence of a complex structure of property rights based 
on dense networks of interenterprise ownership links. Because institu­
tional cross-ownership involved the exchange of shares between nominally 
state-owned firms, Stark insists that the emergent property rights structure 
in Hungary cannot be characterized as one based on private ownership. 
Nor, however, can the rights structure be seen as a disguised form of state 
ownership, since cross-ownership resulted in the establishment of new 
governance structures (i.e., boards of d irectors) made up not of s tate of­
ficials but rather of the managers of those firms that possessed shares of 
a given company. The result, therefore, has been a novel structure of 
property rights that involves the blurring of t he distinction between state 
and private ownership in a manner that has enhanced managerial control 
over productive assets. 
Although institutional cross-ownership represented a clear-cut case of 
organizational innovation, it was nevertheless a type of innovation that 
involved improvisation on, rather than rejection of, "practiced routines" 
(Stark 1996, p. 995). For Stark, the most important legacy left behind by 
state socialism was not the downward devolution of ownership rights to 
enterprise directors but the persistence of networks of informal relations 
linking state enterprises to one another. It has frequently been observed 
that the formal features of the communist command economy 
—mandatory targets, price controls, the central allocation of inputs and 
outputs—were in practice complemented by informal relations of reci­
procity that helped firms maintain production despite bottlenecks in basic 
commodities (Kornai 1992). According to Stark, these informal linkages 
have been institutionalized in the postcommunist period in the form of 
interenterprise ownership ties and, as such, represent the formalization 
of the relations of reciprocity that helped coordinate production during 
the state-socialist period. The implication, of course, is that this form 
institutional cross-ownership has allowed for the persistence of forms of 
coordination based on principles of reciprocity rather than those of the 
market. 
Some have suggested that the existence of relations of reciprocity be­
tween formerly state-owned firms has impeded rather than facilitated the 
transition to capitalism by encouraging the growth of interenterprise debt, 
thereby allowing loss-making firms to remain afloat. While Stark ac­
knowledges that the interenterprise ownership may retard bankruptcy by 
allowing firms to run up substantial debts, his emphasis is nevertheless 
on the manner in which institutional cross-ownership promotes rather 
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than hinders processes of "creative destruction." First, Stark maintains 
that the establishment of interenterprise ownership links facilitates the 
recombination of resources across the boundaries of organizations. Left 
to their own devices, he argues, few enterprises have the resources needed 
to survive in a postcommunist economic environment characterized by 
the loss of traditional markets, the collapse of domestic demand, and 
intense competition from foreign rivals. Once linked by means of inter­
secting ownership ties, however, Hungarian firms are able to recombine 
their resources in innovative ways, enhancing their capacity to respond 
creatively to market pressures. Second, Stark argues that institutional 
cross-ownership promotes investment by spreading risk across intertwined 
firms. Faced with high levels of uncertainty, individual enterprises are 
disinclined to make the large investments that are necessary to acquire 
new technology, move into new production lines, or penetrate new mar­
kets. By spreading risk, institutional cross-ownership mitigates against 
disinclinations to invest, thereby creating the possibility of firms breaking 
out of "low-level equilibrium traps" (Stark 1996, p. 1019). It is important 
to note that, in making these arguments, Stark is taking aim at the theories 
of neoclassical economists. In his view, the clarified system of property 
rights that neoclassical economists favor would impose undue hardship 
on formerly state-owned enterprises, resulting in the exit of a large number 
of v iable enterprises. Thus it is not the clarity of p roperty rights but their 
very ambiguity that promotes the flexible adaptation of enterprises to a 
rapidly changing economic environment (Stark 1996, pp. 1020-21). 
Stark's account of recombinant property in Hungary is very much in 
line with much contemporary research in economic sociology. In recent 
years, a number of studies have put forward the claim that enterprises 
regularly enter into interfirm alliances that facilitate the combination of 
resources across organizational boundaries for the mutual benefit of the 
participating firms (Piore and Sabel 1984; Powell 1990). Given the par­
allels between Stark's analysis and the contemporary research on inter­
enterprise networks, it is not surprising that the recombinant property 
thesis has found a receptive audience. In fact, Stark's notion of recom­
binant property is arguably the most influential of the sociological ac­
counts of p rivatization in former state-socialist societies to have emerged. 
Even empirical studies of property transformation in Hungary remain 
wedded to Stark's concepts. Eyal et al. (1998), for example, analyzed firm-
level data collected in Hungary in 1996 and concluded that capitalism in 
that country was being made not by a "propertied bourgeoisie" but rather 
by a "coalition of propertyless agents" (p. 113), which included the man­
agers who exercised control over state-owned and institutionally cross-
owned firms (pp. 136-37). Like Stark, these authors suggest that enterprise 
directors and their allies blocked genuine privatization and have estab­
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lished instead ambiguous property forms that provide many of the ad­
vantages of private ownership without the risks. Although Eyal et al.'s 
work appears to provide empirical support for Stark's claims, we argue 
that the data tell a different story. 
THE POSTPRIVATIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS STRUCTURE 
Empirical support for the recombinant property thesis comes largely from 
data collected in Hungary in the early 1990s. At that time, the laws 
regulating the transformation of state enterprises into joint-stock com­
panies required enterprises undergoing such "corporatization" to sell a 
portion of their stock to outside parties. Many firms met this condition 
by exchanging shares with other corporatized state enterprises (Voszka 
1993), a process that gave rise to interenterprise ownership networks on 
a relatively large scale. Initially, therefore, Stark was not alone in arguing 
that forms of institutional cross-ownership had emerged in Hungary dur­
ing the years immediately following the collapse of state socialism. A 
number of Hungarian economists and sociologists shared this view, al­
though few went so far as to argue that inter-enterprise ownership rep­
resented a novel property form (Voszka 1990; Matolcsy 1990; Mora 1991). 
Since the early 1990s, however, a number of developments have oc­
curred which appear to have halted the initial trend in the direction of 
institutional cross-ownership. Most important, by the late 1990s officials 
at various state agencies in Hungary had succeeded in transferring own­
ership over a large majority of state enterprises to private parties, foreign 
and domestic. Given the commitment of government officials in Hungary 
to large-scale privatization, it is unclear that the property rights structure 
described by Stark and others in the early 1990s survived the decade. An 
empirical test of the recombinant property thesis thus appears warranted; 
we accomplish this with an original analysis of two firm-level data sets 
that contain detailed information on the ownership of medium-sized and 
large enterprises in Hungary in 1992 and 1997 (Sagi 1993; Szelenyi and 
Kovachs 1998).4 Table 1 presents statistics on the ownership of such en-
4 The data come from two surveys conducted in 1993 and 1998, respectively. The 1993 
survey was based on a random sample of all firms included in the Hoppenstadt business 
register, which is compiled by a German company that has often been used as a 
sampling frame. Interviews were conducted with the CEOs of the firms sampled. The 
1998 data were also drawn from the Hoppenstadt register and, as in 1993, interviews 
were conducted with the CEOs. The 1998 sample differs from the 1993, however, in 
that the later sample was restricted to firms whose revenues were greater than 200 
million forints. In order to ensure comparability, we have limited the analysis of the 
1993 data to firms with revenues at an equivalent level after controlling for inflation. 
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TABLE 1 
MAJORITY OWNERSHIP OF MEDIUM-SIZED AND LARG E ENTER PRISES IN HUNGARY 
FORMERLY STATE-
ALL FIRMS OWNED FIRMS 
1992 1997 1992 1997 
State 4S.9 17.3 65.7 27.1 
Foreign 16.8 2S.6 8.1 17.3 
Domestic individual ... 24.2 39.1 13.0 35.7 
Managers 15.3 13.7 
Employees 7.6 11.8 
Other 16.2 10.2 
Domestic corporate .... 9.4 9.8 9.7 8.2 
No majority 3.9 8.3 3.5 11.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N of cases 673 543 432 255 
NOTE.—Data are from the 1992 Survey of Managers (Sagi 1993) and the 1997 Surve y of Man­
agement of Leading Hungarian Companies (Szeldnyi and Kovdchs 1998). 
terprises in these years, distinguishing between a number of types of 
ownership that we discuss in turn.5 
Foreign ownership.—Table 1 shows that foreign ownership of enter­
prises in Hungary rose between 1992 and 1997 from 16.8% to 25.6%. 
Analysis of t he data indicates that about half of these companies fall into 
the category of greenfield investments; that is, new facilities established 
after 1989 that did not incorporate privatized state assets. The other half 
consist of formerly state-owned enterprises; as table 1 shows, by 1997 
foreign parties had acquired majority ownership rights in 17.3% of for­
merly state-owned enterprises. Because FDI remains concentrated within 
a relatively small number of sectors, however, the statistics presented here 
probably understate the impact that foreign ownership has had on the 
5 D omestic corporate ownership has been treated as a distinct category since the data 
do not allow for the identification of the owners of these corporations themselves. It 
is possible, therefore, that domestic corporate ownership may be a disguise for state 
ownership, since the Hungarian state remains the owner of a sizable number of en­
terprises. Given the pace of privatization in Hungary, however, it is more likely that 
the bulk of these domestic corporations are privately owned. Property transformation 
in the aluminum sector provides an example of the way in which private ownership 
in Hungary has assumed a corporate form. Based on fieldwork conducted in Hungary, 
we found that five of the six firms that were producing aluminum products as of 1997 
were corporately owned. These corporations, however, were not owned by the state 
nor were they institutionally cross-owned. On the contrary, they were owned by Hun­
garian individuals, with a foreign enterprise possessing minority rights in one of the 
two companies. In this sector, therefore, corporate forms did not act as a mask for 
state ownership but rather reflected a tendency among individual owners in Hungary 
to establish corporations in order to reduce their personal liability, as capitalists in 
most countries do. 
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Hungarian economy. It has been estimated, for example, that as of 199S 
foreign parties controlled 40% of manufacturing assets in Hungary and 
that firms with foreign parties on their list of owners accounted for 60% 
of Hungarian exports in that year (Hunya 2000). 
Employee ownership.—Hungarian employees have been able to acquire 
majority ownership rights over the enterprises in which they work in one 
of two ways. First, the government launched an employee stock ownership 
program (ESOP) in 1992 that allowed the employees of a state-owned 
enterprise to establish a special legal entity and subsequently purchase 
the enterprise using guaranteed loans called "E-credits," which were ob­
tained at below-market rates. By mid-1995, this program resulted in the 
sale of approximately 200 enterprises in the state's portfolio to ESOP 
organizations (Lajtai 1997). Second, industrial cooperatives in Hungary 
were transformed en masse into employee-owned limited-liability or joint-
stock companies as a result of legislation passed in 1992 mandating their 
corporatization. Before 1989, thousands of industrial cooperatives oper­
ated in such light industries as textiles, clothing, furniture, and handicrafts. 
After 1992, it was generally employees who obtained shares in corpora-
tized cooperatives according to a formula based on their salary and length 
of service.6 As shown in table 1, by 1997 ESOP and the corporatization 
of industrial cooperatives together allowed employees to acquire owner­
ship of 7.6% of a ll medium-sized and large firms in Hungary and 11.8% 
of formerly state-owned firms. 
Managerial ownership.—The statistics presented in table 1 indicate that 
Hungarian managers have not displayed a disinclination to acquire de 
jure ownership rights over productive assets in Hungary. Researchers who 
have advanced this claim have failed to consider evidence of extensive 
participation in the privatization process on the part of the managers of 
state-owned enterprises. By the mid-1990s, reports had emerged in Hun­
gary that managers were obtaining significant ownership rights over pri­
vatized enterprises via ESOP. Voszka (1995), for example, argued that the 
formulas that determined that distribution of shares of enterprises pri­
vatized through ESOP—formulas based on salary, length of service, and 
the amount of money individuals contributed—resulted in the concen­
tration of shares in the hands of management (see also Rona-Tas 1997). 
More important, in 1993 the government altered the conditions of the E-
credit program in a manner that explicitly favored managers. Following 
6 The transformation of industrial cooperatives into employee-owned companies has 
not received the attention it deserves. The information presented here has been derived 
from interviews we conducted with managers of these companies, who provided details 
of the law mandating transformation and the manner in which shares were distributed 
among employees. 
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this change, managers were able to use their companies' assets as collateral 
for E-credits, a stipulation that allowed them to obtain majority ownership 
rights over their firms and subsequently use a portion of the companies' 
profits to meet loan obligations (Lajtai 1997). Soon after the implemen­
tation of t hese changes, Karsai and Wright (1994) investigated nine firms 
privatized via ESOP and found that managers had acquired more than 
50% of the shares in five of these companies. Our analysis supports the 
conclusion that the managers of state enterprises have emerged in the 
postcommunist period as owners of privatized firms. By 1997 former 
managers had acquired ownership of 15 .3% of al l medium-sized to large 
firms in Hungry and 13.7% of former state enterprises (see table I).7 
Other domestic individuals.—Enterprise insiders were not the only do­
mestic parties to have acquired ownership of state-owned companies in 
Hungary: as of 1997, 16.2% of all medium-sized and large firms and 10.2% 
of formerly state-owned enterprises were owned by Hungarian citizens 
who had been neither employees nor managers of the firms they acquired 
(see table 1). We came across instances of this type of domestic ownership 
in the course of i nvestigating the aluminum sector. Initially firms in this 
sector had been placed in the category of long-term state ownership. 
Following the victory of the Socialists in 1994, however, officials at the 
State Property Agency (SPA) were instructed to locate buyers for alu­
minum firms as rapidly as possible. Because interest on the part of foreign 
multinationals was limited, the SPA had little choice but to sell most of 
the facilities in question to two companies whose controlling shares were 
in the hands of a small number of Hungarian individuals. Given the lack 
of savings among domestic parties, it is reasonable to ask how these 
individuals were able to generate the sums needed to acquire the com­
panies. The answer is that the SPA sold the firms for an extraordinarily 
low price. Although the details of the sales remain officially confidential, 
information leaked to the press indicates that, in one case, a facility that 
had been responsible for the production of 200,000 tons of aluminum-
oxide products in 1988 was acquired in 1996 for the forint equivalent of 
$50,000 USD (MTI-Econews 1997a). This action indicates that officials 
in Hungary were willing to part with firms at very low prices in those 
instances in which foreign interest was minimal, and this practice appears 
to have facilitated the transfer of ownership rights over state-owned en­
terprises to domestic parties. 
State ownership.—The percentage of firms owned by the state declined 
considerably between 1992 and 1997, from 45.9% to 17.3% (table 1). Firms 
that remained state-owned as of 1997 fell into one of two categories: 
7 T he data include the past employment histories of managers, permitting the identi­
fication of individuals who had directed state-owned enterprises prior to 1997. 
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enterprises the state was unwilling to privatize and those for which it had 
not yet located buyers. Research suggests that the majority of the firms 
that remained state owned as of 1997 fell into the former category. Ac­
cording to Voszka (2000), of the 306 firms that the state owned as of 1998, 
180 were in the category of long-term state ownership, and were concen­
trated in such sectors as agriculture, forestry, and transportation. This left 
126 firms for which state officials were actively seeking buyers. Because 
firms in this latter group have been slated to be sold or liquidated within 
a few years, it is not unreasonable to expect that the number of medium-
sized and large firms under state ownership in Hungary will decline fur­
ther over time. 
No majority owner.—One other category deserves close scrutiny: firms 
with no majority owner. Supporters of Stark's recombinant property thesis 
would expect a large number of institutionally cross-owned firms to fall 
into this category, since shares of such firms are by definition distributed 
among a number of parties. In fact, a relatively high proportion of firms 
(10%) had no majority owner as of 1997 (table 1). Closer inspection reveals, 
however, that relatively few of the firms lacking a majority owner were 
institutionally cross-owned. Our analysis of the 1997 data indicates that 
a majority of the firms in this category (55.6%) were of a single type: firms 
in which managers and employees jointly held majority ownership rights. 
More than likely, these were firms that were privatized through ESOP 
after the implementation of changes facilitating managerial participation. 
Another 24.4% of the firms without majority owners were jointly held 
by identifiable private parties, foreign and domestic. Finally, only 10.1% 
of firms with no majority owner involved any degree of state ownership. 
Within this category of ownership, in other words, there is very little 
evidence of either institutional cross-ownership or the "blurring" of state 
and private property. 
Institutional cross-ownership.—Defenders of the recombinant property 
thesis may argue that, in and of itself, evidence of large-scale privatization 
does not amount to a refutation of the recombinant property thesis. They 
might point out, for example, that even subsequent to privatization, the 
state may retain minority ownership rights of such magnitude as to place 
the enterprises in question into the category of recombinant property. This 
is not an unreasonable proposition since, according to Hungarian law, 
shareholders who control at least 25% of a firm's equity have the power 
to veto vital actions such as mergers, acquisitions, divestments, and 
changes to the rights attached to different types of shares (Pechota 1990). 
In many cases, government officials in Hungary announced their intention 
of maintaining not 50% but a "25% plus 1" share in a given company 
since that level of ownership gave the state a considerable voice, if not 
in the daily operations of the firm, at least in the determination of key 
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TABLE 2 
CROSS-OWNERSHIP AMONG MEDIUM-SIZED T O LAR GE FIRM S IN HUNGARY, 1997 






Corporate N o f Cases 
All firms: 
State 3.2 2.1 3.2 94 
Foreign 2.2 10.8 5.0 139 
Domestic individual ... 2.3 10.0 3.2 212 
Domestic corporate .... 3.8 11.3 7.5 53 
Total 1.8 5.0 6.0 3.4 498 
Formerly state-owned 
firms only: 
State 2.9 1.4 2.9 69 
Foreign 4.5 13.6 2.3 44 
Domestic individual ... 3.2 11.7 3.2 91 
Domestic corporate .... 4.8 19.0 9.5 21 
Total —. 2.2 6.7 6.2 2.7 225 
NOTE.—Data are from the 1997 Surve y of Management of L eading Hungarian Companies (Szeldnyi 
and Kov&chs 1998). Minority owner has a 25%-49% stake; majority owner has 50% or more. 
decisions.8 Because of the ownership rights that the "25% plus 1" rule 
confers in Hungary, a full test of the recombinant property thesis requires 
analysis of the distribution of minority ownership rights at this threshold. 
Table 2 cross-tabulates firms by majority and minority ownership, with 
minority ownership set at the 25% level. Contrary to the recombinant 
property thesis, only a relatively small percentage of firms (15.2% of all 
firms and 17.8% of formerly state-owned firms) reported minority holdings 
at the 25% threshold as of 1997. Governance of a large majority of Hun­
garian firms, in other words, was firmly in the hands of majority owners 
by that year. Furthermore, our analysis fails to uncover evidence of the 
interpenetration of state and private property on a significant scale. As 
of 1997 the state exercised 25% ownership rights in very few privately 
owned firms (1.8%) while foreign companies had 25% ownership rights 
in only 3.2% of firms that were majority state-owned, and domestic in­
dividuals held such stakes in only 2.1% of state-owned firms. On the basis 
of these findings, it appears safe to say that, by 1997, the property rights 
structure in Hungary was characterized by clear and unambiguous own­
ership rights. 
It should be noted that recent studies by Hungarian researchers support 
* Among those firms slated to remain in permanent state ownership in the government's 
initial decree of October 1992, e.g., the state was expected to retain majority ownership 
in approximately one-half (61 of 126 enterprises) and "25 percent plus 1" ownership 
in the remainder (MTI-Econews 1992a). 
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our conclusion that majority ownership rights over Hungarian firms are 
generally in the hands of identifiable private parties (T6th 1997; Csite 
and Kovach 1999; Major, Vezzoni, and Szalavetz 1999; Mih&lyi 2000). 
Our analysis, however, has contributed to the ongoing debate over re­
combinant property in two ways. First, we have subjected the recom­
binant property thesis to a more rigorous test than has been undertaken 
in these recent studies by examining ownership ties at the 25% threshold 
according to type of majority owner. Even at this level, we find almost 
no evidence of the forms of interenterprise ownership described earlier 
by Stark. Second, we have explicitly assessed the claim regarding the 
interpenetration of state and private ownership, something existing studies 
have failed to do. Again, we find little evidence of the hybrid forms of 
ownership that the recombinant property hypothesis predicts. 
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF PROPERTY TRANSFORMATION 
Recent developments in Hungary cast serious doubt on the contemporary 
relevance of the recombinant property thesis. While forms of interenter­
prise ownership may have emerged in Hungary during the years imme­
diately following the collapse of communism, the commitment of gov­
ernment officials to dispose of state-owned assets appears to have 
transformed the property rights structures in ways supporters of the thesis 
failed to anticipate. In this section we elaborate an alternative theory of 
property transformation that highlights the role of the state as well as 
that of international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the European Union (EU). Any analysis of property transfor­
mation in Hungary, we argue, must bring the state to the fore, given its 
capacity to allocate ownership rights over productive assets and thereby 
shape economic developments. Such an appreciation for the ability of the 
state to intervene in economic processes via its property rights actions 
must be balanced, however, by the recognition that pressures imposed by 
international agencies such as the IMF and the EU may limit the state's 
autonomy in the economic arena. Our purpose in this section, then, is to 
outline a theory of property transformation in Hungary that both rec­
ognizes that integration into global and regional markets has diminished 
the regulatory autonomy of the Hungarian state in many ways, and ac­
knowledges that Hungarian state actors have nevertheless retained a ca­
pacity to intervene decisively in economic processes through their property 
rights actions. 
Our effort to explain the course of privatization in Hungary incorporates 
three basic insights from the literature on comparative political economy. 
We start with a proposition that is repeated often in this literature: in 
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order to promote the domestic accumulation of capital, the state frequently 
adopts policies that favor local elites at the expense of foreign multina­
tionals. Evan's (1979) analysis of dependent development addresses this 
theme with particular clarity. The main elements of h is argument can be 
summarized as follows. State actors have a vested interest in promoting 
the domestic accumulation of capital since the state's own resources are 
drawn largely from the local economy. In developing countries, however, 
the state's interest in domestic development often clashes with the de­
termination of multinational corporations to repatriate locally generated 
profits to promote their global business strategies. Because local elites 
typically lack the organizational capacity to pursue international strategies 
and thus have little choice but to improve their market position by in­
vesting locally, there tends to be a greater coincidence of interests between 
the state and local business elites than between the state and foreign 
capital. For these reasons, states in developing societies typically adopt a 
two-pronged developmental strategy, the first of which involves the ap­
plication of pressures on multinationals to invest locally and to involve 
domestic producers in their production activities, the second of which 
involves a variety of efforts to promote the economic activities of local 
business elites. As we shall demonstrate, state actors in Hungary accepted 
this logic and, we will argue, for good reasons. 
The determination of state actors in Hungary to implement privati­
zation policies that favored domestic parties provoked a strong reaction 
on the part of international agencies. In order to assess the capacity of 
such organizations as the IMF and EU to affect the course of privatization 
in Hungary, we turn to our second insight: Haggard's (1995) notion of 
"deep integration." In his analysis of the incorporation of developing 
nations into the global economy, Haggard distinguishes between "shallow 
integration," by which he means the relaxations of restrictions on trade 
and macroeconomic stabilization, and "deep integration," the harmoni­
zation of rules governing foreign direct investment, competition, industrial 
policy, and other forms of economic regulation. According to Haggard, 
shallow integration is often embraced by domestic coalitions who have 
an interest in liberalizing the economy. However, developing countries 
only adopt a "deep integration agenda" when confronted by "powerful 
economic and political constraints" (Haggard 1995, pp. 6-7). On Hag­
gard's list of constraints are three types of pressure that are relevant for 
Hungary: an external debt burden, lending policies pursued by interna­
tional financial institutions, and bilateral pressures applied by such entities 
as the EU. In the case of Hungary, these external forces worked in unison, 
pressuring state actors to establish in short order an open market economy 
in which foreign investments were both welcome and secure. 
The last insight from the literature on comparative political economy 
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involves the "property rights actions" of s tates, or, more specifically, the 
observation that states frequently influence the governance of economic 
sectors by manipulating property rights (Campbell and Lindberg 1990; 
Fligstein 1996). Over the years, political economists have highlighted a 
number of ways in which states intervene in the construction and main­
tenance of markets, for example, by directing investment, subsidizing 
industries, erecting tariff barriers, and imposing currency and price con­
trols (Moran 1974; Becker 1983; Bennett and Sharpe 1985). As Campbell 
and Lindberg (1990) point out, however, the capacity of states to influence 
economic processes through the manipulation of property rights has not 
received the scholarly attention it deserves. Focusing on developments in 
the United States, they show that state actors have frequently engaged 
in property rights actions in order to transform "governance regimes"—the 
specific combinations of organizational forms (markets, hierarchies, as­
sociations, and networks) that coordinate economic activity among firms 
in a given sector. Campbell and Lindberg draw two important conclusions 
from their analysis: first, that the state is capable of exerting a pronounced 
influence on economic processes through the manipulation of property 
rights alone, and second, that the definition of property rights is a con­
tinuously contested process given the capacity of the state to alter con­
ditions of ownership (see also Fligstein 1996). An emphasis on the property 
rights actions of the state is crucial for an understanding of developments 
in Hungary: the conformity to standards imposed by such agencies as the 
IMF and EU restricted the range of policy options open to government 
officials, leaving the allocation of property rights as the most effective 
instrument in their arsenal for affecting economic developments. 
Taken together, we believe these insights constitute a comprehensive 
theory of property change in Hungary. The notion of deep integration 
highlights not only the determination of international agencies to open 
the country to FDI but also the methods those agencies use to achieve 
this end. The theory of dependent development reminds us that, even in 
the face of such pressure, states continue to make efforts to promote 
domestic accumulation. Finally, the emphasis on the property rights ac­
tions of s tates ties the first two theoretical strands together. Because the 
Hungarian state retained formal ownership over most productive assets 
in that country after 1989, state actors were able to influence economic 
developments through the preferential allocation of property rights to 
domestic parties despite the constraints imposed by international agencies 
such as the IMF and EU. 
It should be noted that, up to this point, the theoretical framework we 
have proposed does not specify the relative strength of the two parties in 
question—the state and international agencies—in determining economic 
policy. The role of the state in the global economy is of course an issue 
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that is of considerable interest to researchers in a number of d isciplines. 
Although a number of d istinct approaches have been put forward, three 
perspectives appear to dominate the discussion. At one extreme are re­
searchers who argue that globalization has created a "borderless" world 
in which the efforts of states to manage economic processes are at best 
futile and at worst dysfunctional (Ohmae 1990). A somewhat less extreme 
position but one that still posits a considerable loss of capacity on the 
part of states is what has been termed the "competition state" perspective 
(Stopford and Strange 1992; Cerny 1993). According to this view, growing 
competition for investment has forced states to abandon most of the in­
terventionist policies used in the past, to follow neoliberal principles in 
regard to competition, trade, monetary, and fiscal policy, and to improve 
the overall economic climate by investing in education and infrastructure. 
A sizable number of r esearchers, however, argue that states in the global 
economy retain far more capacity to intervene in markets than the com­
petition state model allows. According to the "developmental state" per­
spective, for example, contemporary governments do not simply enforce 
neoliberal arrangements. On the contrary, they play a central role in fos­
tering domestic development through an assortment of "protective and 
promotional policies" that systematically violate neoliberal principles re­
garding the role of the state in the economy (Wade 1990; see also Amsden 
1989; Johnson 1982; Evans 1995). 
The theoretical framework outlined here falls broadly into the devel­
opmental state camp. It should be noted, however, that such an approach 
has not been favored by researchers examining economic transformations 
in postcommunist Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the consensus has 
been that, because of the ideological climate in the years immediately 
following the collapse of communism as well as pressures from interna­
tional agencies such as the IMF, state actors in postcommunist Eastern 
Europe rejected developmental models—such as those pioneered by East 
Asian countries—in favor of neoliberal model that largely restricts the 
state's role in the economy to the enforcement of property rights and the 
removal of impediments to private enterprise (Amsden et al. 1994; Camp­
bell and Pedersen 1996).9 We argue, however, that in the case of Hungary 
9 Campbell and Pedersen (1996) argue that progressive conformity to the neoliberal 
model was the result of normative processes rather than coercive pressures. In their 
view, Western governments, foreign universities, and international agencies persuaded 
postcommunist governments in the region to adopt neoliberal principles by organizing 
conferences, providing advisors, generating publications, and financing educational 
activities. Largely as a result of these "cultural and associational" processes, postcom­
munist governments in such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary en­
acted a remarkably similar set of policies in the early 1990s, embracing in particular 
those elements of the shock-therapy program advanced by Western economists that 
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such an emphasis on conformity with a neoliberal model of the state is 
misplaced. As our analysis will show, state actors in that country were 
far from being instrumentally incapacitated. Even as they pushed through 
legislation that progressively opened the country to global markets, gov­
ernment officials in Hungary continued to play a central role in fostering 
domestic accumulation through their property rights actions. 
COERCIVE PRESSURES 
Although their focus is on the ability of states to influence economic 
processes, developmental state theorists nevertheless acknowledge the 
constraints under which state actors operate. As is regularly noted in the 
literature, the capacities of states to intervene in market processes are far 
from absolute and, in many instances, states have lost recourse to instru­
ments widely utilized in the past (Boltho 1996; Helleiner 1994). Further­
more, the range of policy options available to state actors varies consid­
erably, due in large part to the extent to which a given country is integrated 
into international markets (Held et al. 1999). In order to understand the 
choice of instruments available to state actors, therefore, it is necessary 
to examine closely the types of external pressures to which they have been 
exposed. In the case of Hungary, we follow Haggard (1995) in highlighting 
three sources of p ressure in particular: an external debt burden, the lend­
ing policies of international financial institutions, and bilateral pressures 
from the EU. 
Foreign Debt 
Hungary found itself in 1989 with the highest per capita debt in the world. 
In that year, net external debt stood at about $16 billion, or about 50% 
of GDP (World Bank 1995, p. 1). Most of this took the form of state debt 
pertained to macroeconomic stabilization and the liberalization of prices and trade. In 
discussing the diffusion of neoliberal principles in Eastern Europe, however, it is 
important to note that consensus in regard to the legitimacy of these principles never 
extended to the privatization of state enterprises. Because postcommunist governments 
could ill afford the political fall-out that would accompany plant closures, postcom­
munist governments in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia adopted gradualistic 
approaches toward privatization that involved the extension of subsidies and credits 
to enterprises. Such approaches deviated from those proposed by international agencies 
such as the IMF and the World Bank, which advocated rapid privatization, the im­
mediate hardening of enterprise budget constraints, and the liquidation of loss-making 
firms. Far from converging toward a standard model as a result of normative pressures, 
postcommunist governments in Eastern Europe generally resisted such pressures and 
implemented privatization policies that diverged substantially from the neoliberal 
model (King 2000, 2002). 
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to private banks as opposed to international lending agencies, which ruled 
out the possibility that the debt, or at least a portion of it, would be 
forgiven. Nor was default an option, since such a move would have cut 
Hungary off from further credit from both institutional and private lend­
ers. Finally, officials in the first postcommunist government decided 
against renegotiating the debt on the grounds that this would have lowered 
Hungary's credit rating and eliminated Hungary's chances of partici­
pating in certain loan programs (Denton 1990). Faced with this set of 
circumstances, Hungarian officials had little choice but to repay the debt 
as scheduled. 
This decision led to a new question: How was the government to obtain 
the revenue to meet Hungary's debt obligations? The amount of money 
needed to satisfy these obligations was sizable, particularly in light of the 
recession that followed the collapse of communism. The solution that 
government officials devised was to divert revenues obtained from the 
privatization of state enterprises toward the repayment of the international 
debt. In January 1990, the first postcommunist government of Jozef Antall 
announced that 85% of privatization revenues would be channeled toward 
the repayment of state debt (MTI-Econews 1990a). This policy had a 
number of implications, not all of which met with popular approval. For 
one, the government's need for revenue ruled out the restitution of phys­
ical assets to previous owners or their descendants. In the months follow­
ing the first elections, the Smallholder's Party (a member of the governing 
coalition) was pressing the government to implement precisely this kind 
of program. Spokespersons for the prime minister ruled this out, arguing 
in no uncertain terms that state-owned assets were not to be given away 
but rather exchanged for cash (MTI-Econews 19906).10 More important, 
the decision to use privatization as a means of obtaining needed revenue 
implied that a significant number of state-owned enterprises would be 
sold to foreign multinationals for the simple reason that Hungarian in­
dividuals and firms had very little capital at their disposal. Thus, despite 
considerable domestic resistance to the idea of selling state enterprises off 
to the highest bidder, the Antall government made no effort to disguise 
the fact that its privatization policy involved a concerted effort to attract 
foreign capital. On the contrary, the stated goal of the government was 
to sell 25%-30% of state-owned enterprises to foreign parties within five 
years (MTI-Econews 1991). In order to translate this policy into practice, 
!0 The government's position on restitution softened somewhat over time. Although it 
never countenanced the return of physical assets, it did compromise by providing 
individuals who had lost property after the communist seizure of power—as well as 
those who had been persecuted for political reasons—compensation vouchers that they 
could use to obtain land or shares in privatized enterprises. 
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the government quickly passed a number of bills, among them generous 
tax reductions for foreign investors (World Bank 1995). 
International Financial Institutions 
There is a substantial literature detailing the pressures international fi­
nancial institutions have imposed upon states, particularly states in less 
developed societies. In order to obtain funding from such institutions, 
state governments are regularly required to meet strict targets regarding 
budget and current account deficits as well as to engage in various types 
of restructuring involving, for example, the privatization of state enter­
prises and the reform of financial institutions. In the case of Hungary, 
two institutions in particular head the list of agencies that have put pres­
sure on successive governments to privatize state-owned enterprises and 
open the country to foreign investment: the IMF and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
Discussions of the ability of international lending agencies to force 
changes in governmental policies generally begin with the IMF, and for 
good reason. It is not only the material support that the agency itself 
provides that makes its role so important but also the fact that govern­
ments have to maintain good relations with the IMF in order to obtain 
resources from other sources, including private capital markets. The link 
between IMF approval of a given country's fiscal policies and that coun­
try's access to external resources is often explicit; Hungarian access to 
$300 million dollars worth of loans from the World Bank and the Japanese 
Eximbank in 1990, for example, depended on the satisfactory conclusion 
of negotiations with IMF officials (MTI-Econews 1992a). In addition, the 
cost of raising capital from private sources is directly linked to the status 
of a given country vis-a-vis the IMF. Those that are in good standing 
with the agency are rewarded with favorable credit ratings from organ­
izations such as Moody's, reducing the costs of raising capital in inter­
national markets, while those in poor standing see their credit rating fall 
and the costs of raising capital climb precipitously. IMF disapproval of 
a government's fiscal and budgetary programs can thus effectively elim­
inate any chances of obtaining capital from either institutional or private 
parties, a fact of which successive Hungarian governments were well 
aware (Kornai 1997). 
There is another important point regarding IMF policies in Hungary 
that deserves mention: the IMF targets regarding budget deficits and 
current account balances were directly linked to privatization. IMF of­
ficials made very clear their conviction that the rapid privatization of 
state-owned enterprises was essential if the Hungarian government was 
to stay within agreed-upon targets. For example, the privatization of state 
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enterprises involved a reduction of subsidies to enterprises as well as the 
removal of a large number of workers from the state payroll. Both of 
these outcomes reduced pressure on the state budget. In addition, the sale 
of state enterprises to foreign parties increased the amount of capital 
flowing into the country relative to that flowing out, reducing the current 
account deficit. IMF officials therefore advised Hungary on repeated oc­
casions to divest itself of productive enterprises as rapidly as possible and 
to open the country to foreign investment (Wapenhans 1990). Thus, even 
though the formal targets to which the Hungarian government pledged 
to abide did not refer directly to privatization, the effort to attain these 
targets nevertheless implied not only the rapid privatization of state en­
terprises but also the sale of these enterprises to foreign parties. 
Like the IMF, the EBRD was committed to the establishment of an 
economy based on the free trade of goods and services and the private 
ownership of the means of production. What this implied for Hungary 
was the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of 
corporate governance structures, the enactment of bankruptcy and com­
petition laws, and the reform of financial institutions (Aghion 1991). Act­
ing on these principles, the EBRD intervened in a very direct fashion in 
the privatization process, assuming the role of "strategic investor" by 
injecting capital into firms, thereby acquiring minority ownership rights 
and a seat on the boards of directors. The EBRD relied on this strategy 
extensively in Hungary; between 1991 and 1996 it purchased more than 
$1 billion worth of equity in some of the country's most visible companies 
in such sectors as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, automobile manufacturing, 
textiles, hotels, and retail trade (MTI-Econews 19976). Furthermore, in 
1995 the EBRD became involved in the privatization of Hungary's banks, 
utilizing the same strategy that had been applied to other enterprises, 
namely the acquisition of minority ownership rights to assist restructuring 
and to attract additional outside investors (MTI-Econews 1997c). 
Membership in the European Union 
Each of the governments that has ruled Hungary since the collapse of 
state socialism has had as one of its main goals entry into the EU (Denton 
1990). The reasons underlying this position are not difficult to discern. In 
the view of government officials, the long-term growth of the Hungarian 
economy hinged upon admission to the union. Among government offi­
cials, the benefits of such membership were impossible to ignore: the inflow 
ol investment, higher wages, and funds for environmental clean-up, in­
frastructure, health care, and education (World Bank 1999). These benefits 
came at a considerable cost, however. In particular, admission into the 
EU required the Hungarian government to observe strict limits regarding 
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budget deficits and the size of the public debt, and furthermore, to bring 
legal and regulatory codes into line with EU standards. Both of these 
requirements affected the Hungarian government's policies toward 
privatization. 
There is no need to discuss here the manner in which the EU's budg­
etary and debt targets provided Hungarian officials with an incentive to 
dispose of state enterprises to foreign parties; this argument has already 
been laid out in the discussion of pressures emanating from the IMF. It 
should be noted, however, that the EU's standards in regard to the size 
of the budget deficit were considerably more stringent to those adopted 
by the IMF.11 In addition, one of the preconditions of admission into the 
EU was the full "harmonization" of political, legal, and regulatory prac­
tices. Such harmonization required prospective members to bring their 
political and legal systems into full conformity with EU standards. In and 
of itself, this was no mean feat; the list of standards to which a given 
country is required to conform fills many volumes and covers such matters 
as rules governing elections, environmental regulations, trade policies, the 
structure of the legal system, tax codes, the provision of pensions and 
health care, and so on. In regard to privatization and foreign participation 
in the economy, harmonization required convergence with EU standards 
regarding such issues as corporate governance, the protection of the rights 
of minority shareholders, the sanctity of investments, the repatriation of 
profits, bankruptcy and competition policy, and the reform of financial 
institutions (European Commission 1995). While EU officials have been 
somewhat tolerant of failure to stay within budgetary targets, they have 
taken a hard line in regard to issues pertaining to legal and regulatory 
harmonization. Nothing short of full convergence has been acceptable to 
EU commissioners (Bobinski 1997). 
Since 1989, postcommunist governments in Hungary have progressively 
brought the country into compliance with the EU. By 1997, the country 
had largely achieved harmonization with EU standards, as evident in a 
report published by the European Commission (1999) that commented 
favorably on Hungary's efforts. Furthermore, the rules to which the EU 
required Hungary to conform are consistent with the neoliberal model of 
the state promoted by the IMF and EBRD, in the sense that compliance 
with EU standards explicitly ruled out many forms of s tate intervention 
in market processes. EU standards are designed to facilitate the free flow 
of goods, services, and capital across the borders of member states and 
to allow firms based in one member state the freedom to operate within 
the territory of another member state. In practice, observance of these 
11 Whereas the IMF typically encouraged governments to bring the state deficit below 
5% of GDP on an annual basis, the EU has preferred a 3% benchmark. 
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standards has ruled out recourse to policies on which states have histor­
ically relied to promote domestic development. For example, in order to 
remain in accordance with EU standards, the Hungarian state was re­
quired to eliminate prohibitions on FBI, to remove restrictions on the 
repatriation of profits through such devices as currency controls or dis­
criminatory taxation, to break down tariff barriers with other EU mem­
bers, and to enforce competition laws that greatly limited the govern­
ment's capacity to support domestic firms by means of direct subsidies, 
soft loans, export credits, or favorable treatment in the area of government 
procurement (World Bank 1999). 
In sum, the external pressures that government officials in Hungary 
confronted during the 1990s did not push in divergent directions but 
worked in unison toward establishing in as short a time frame as possible 
a functioning market economy in which foreign investments were both 
welcome and secure. Homogenization with EU standards, for example, 
explicitly excluded the possibility of s tate actors using taxes, tariffs, cur­
rency controls, restrictions on the repatriation of profits, or prohibitions 
on direct foreign investment to promote domestic development. Fiscal 
targets imposed by the IMF and EU placed strict limitations on the ability 
of state actors to direct investment toward firms In certain sectors and, 
in addition, encouraged the sale of state enterprises to foreign parties in 
order to reduce budget and current account deficits. Finally, the obligation 
to repay the debt incurred by communist governments further pressured 
state actors into selling enterprises to foreign multinationals in order to 
channel proceeds toward the repayment of privately held debt. Taken 
together, these external pressures effectively denied government officials 
access to most of the instruments states have used to foster local industries. 
One instrument of economic intervention, however, was not strictly reg­
ulated by the international agencies in question: the allocation of own­
ership rights over state-owned enterprises. Denied other means of inter­
vention, state actors in Hungary relied greatly on property rights actions 
in an effort to influence economic developments in the country. It is to 
this story that we turn next. 
CHANGING PRIVATIZATION POLICIES IN HUNGARY 
In this section we describe in more detail the manner in which external 
pressures affected the course of p rivatization in Hungary. The entire pri­
vatization process can be roughly divided into three periods: an initial 
period from 1990 to 1992 during which the need to channel privatization 
revenues toward the repayment of the external debt led to determination 
on the part of the government to promote the sale of s tate enterprises to 
150 
Postcommunist Hungary 
foreign multinationals, an intermediate period from 1993 to 1994 during 
which domestic resistance to the sell-off of enterprises to foreigners led 
the government to implement a set of policies that subsidized the sale of 
enterprises to domestic parties but in turn resulted in the deterioration of 
external support for the government's policies, and the final period from 
1995 to 1997 during which the socialist government of Gyula Horn gave 
in to international pressures and accelerated the privatization process, 
including the privatization of firms in the financial, energy, and telecom­
munications sectors. With this, the privatization process in Hungary was 
largely completed, with foreign capital dominating key sectors of the econ­
omy, domestic owners holding a sizable number of businesses particularly 
in labor-intensive sectors of the economy, and the state left in control of 
a few hundred firms concentrated in such sectors as defense, steel, trans­
port, and agriculture. 
The Initial Phase, 1990-92 
As noted, the obligation to meet debt obligations inherited from the so­
cialist regime forced the first postcommunist government of Jozsef Antall 
to implement a privatization policy that emphasized the sale of state-
owned enterprises to foreign parties. This policy was a successful one, for 
a time, with foreign capital responding quickly to the government's efforts 
to raise hard currency via the sale of state-owned enterprises. As table 1 
shows, foreign buyers dominated the privatization process during the first 
years of postcommunist rule; in 1991, for example, sales to foreign parties 
accounted for more than three-quarters of the privatization proceeds for 
that year, and in 1992 for more than half of these proceeds. A total of $6 
billion of foreign investment entered Hungary between January 1990 and 
January 1993, making Hungary the largest recipient of foreign investment 
in Eastern Europe in per capita terms (World Bank 1995, p. 151). While 
much of this capital inflow took the form of greenfield investment in new 
production facilities, a sizable proportion involved the sale of existing 
enterprises to multinational corporations; by the end of 1992, approxi­
mately half of FDI had gone toward the purchase of formerly state-owned 
enterprises (van Elkin 19986). As promised, much of this revenue was 
channeled toward the repayment of the state's external debt. In 1991 
alone, the equivalent of $200 million in privatization revenues was used 
for this purpose (van Elkin 19986). 
One result of this massive infusion of FDI was the transfer of control 
of entire sectors of the economy to foreign multinationals. The tobacco 
industry is a perfect example. Under state ownership as of 1990, firms in 
the tobacco sector attracted a great deal of foreign attention due to the 
desire of foreign multinationals to take advantage of cheap Hungarian 
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labor and to acquire market share in a country containing a sizable num­
ber of cigarette smokers. Firms such as R. J. Reynolds quickly made their 
interest known to the SPA, which in turn began to invite tenders on 
tobacco-processing and cigarette-manufacturing plants in 1991 in accord 
with new policies that permitted investor-initiated transformations. 
Within a year, all of Hungary's tobacco and cigarette companies had been 
sold (for a total price of $200 million) to the multinationals that dominated 
the global production of cigarettes (MTI-Econews 1993a). The same pro­
cess was at work in other sectors producing consumer goods; within four 
years, foreign capital effectively dominated segments of the Hungarian 
economy such as food processing and cosmetics (Lajtai 1997). 
Not surprisingly, the readiness of the Hungarian government to part 
with state enterprises met with the support of international agencies. The 
IMF demonstrated its approval by extending a $1.6 billion loan to Hun­
gary in 1991, to be released in tranches conditional upon the government's 
capacity to stay within IMF-imposed targets. More important, the overt 
vote of confidence that international agencies gave Hungary helped the 
country earn a solid credit rating. This, combined with the fact that the 
inflow of foreign capital had radically improved Hungary's current ac­
count balance, allowed the country to continue to obtain capital from 
private sources at a relatively low cost, a favorable development for a 
country like Hungary, which acquired the bulk of the funds it needed not 
from institutional lenders but rather from private sources (World Bank 
1995). 
At the same time as the Antall government was bolstering Hungary's 
standing in the eyes of the international financial community, it was also 
making efforts to satisfy the EU's demands regarding harmonization. 
Since the first postcommunist government took office in 1990, Hungarian 
officials had gone to great lengths to achieve legal and regulatory har­
monization. As early as 1990, parliament established a special commission 
to ensure that new legislation was in line with EU standards (MTI-Eco­
news 1997e). In 1991, Hungary and the EU signed an association agree­
ment that reduced tariffs on the export of Hungarian goods to EU coun­
tries in exchange for a commitment on the part of the Hungarian 
government to continue down the road toward full harmonization. In 
many areas, such as laws pertaining to corporate governance and bank­
ruptcy, convergence with EU standards was obtained by 1991 (Mills 1991). 
Despite the fact that Hungary was rewarded for its conformity to in­
ternational standards, not everyone in the country supported the govern­
ment's efforts. In fact, resistance to such conformity emerged very early, 
even within governmental circles. As noted above, representatives from 
the Smallholder's Party objected to the fact that the government's policy 
of channeling privatization revenue toward the repayment of the external 
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debt ruled out the possibility of restituting physical property to its original 
owners. Even one of the vice presidents of the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum, the ruling party, objected in 1992 to the "sell-out" of state property 
to foreign parties (Robinson 1992). As time went on, domestic opposition 
to the government's privatization policy grew, particularly since the im­
proved standing of the government in the eyes of the international fi­
nancial community did not coincide with improvements in its citizens' 
standard of living. On the contrary, progress along the privatization front 
was matched by further economic declines. In 1991 alone, GDP fell by 
11.9% (World Bank 1995, p. 2). Under such conditions, it is not surprising 
that public discontent translated into a shift in the government's priva­
tization policies away from an emphasis on cash sales to foreign multi­
nationals and toward the subsidized sale of enterprises to domestic parties. 
The Intermediate Phase, 1993-94 
Opposition to foreign domination of the privatization process within the 
ruling coalition in Hungary resulted in a change of course during this 
period, involving specifically the establishment of restrictions on foreign 
ownership of firms in key economic sectors such as banking, energy, and 
telecommunications and the implementation of policies promoting the sale 
of state enterprises to domestic parties. The capacity of the Hungarian 
government to accomplish these goals was predicated on the fact that it 
had taken a number of moves in 1992 to reassert its control over state-
owned assets. In particular, government officials had obtained passage of 
legislation that required state-owned enterprises to "corporatize" (i.e., to 
transform themselves into limited-liability or joint-stock companies) by 
January 1, 1993. In practice this meant that the SPA obtained the right, 
previously exercised by enterprise councils made up jointly of workers 
and managers, to appoint and remove directors. In addition, the man­
datory corporatization law provided the state with a lever of control over 
the thousands of limited-liability and joint-stock companies that had been 
legally established by enterprise insiders since the passage of the 1989 
Transformation Law. Prior to mandatory corporatization, managers had 
exercised considerable control over many of these "satellites" since the 
holding companies that controlled these satellites were governed by en­
terprise councils under their direction. By abolishing these councils, the 
mandatory corporatization law effectively transferred to the SPA property 
rights not only over state enterprises themselves but also over the many 
thousands of new companies that had emerged alongside state enterprises 
(Voszka 1995). 
In 1992, the government also began its bailout of Hungary's six largest 
commercial banks, purchasing debt and injecting enormous sums of 
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money into the banks in exchange for equity. As a result of this debt-for-
equity swap, the state (through the Ministry of Finance) once again came 
to exercise majority ownership rights over Hungary's major banks. This 
in turn gave government officials enormous leverage over state-owned 
enterprises, allowing them to extract concessions from enterprise directors 
before extending new credit (Voszka 1994). Finally, 1992 saw the passage 
of legislation creating a special agency, the State Asset Management Com­
pany (SAMC), to oversee the activities of hundreds of firms that were 
designated to remain under long-term state ownership. Firms slated for 
long-term state ownership included some of the largest enterprises in 
Hungary in such sectors as metallurgy, engineering, energy, telecommu­
nications, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Taken together, the enterprises 
under the control of the SAMC accounted for more than half of all state-
owned assets (Voszka 1995, p. 298). Although outside investors were wel­
come to purchase stakes in these companies, the legislation that estab­
lished the SAMC required the state to retain significant ownership rights 
for the foreseeable future, a requirement that effectively discouraged out­
side investment. Furthermore, the state's power to intervene into the 
affairs of firms placed under long-term ownership was pronounced. The 
SAMC, for example, not only had the right to hire and fire managers but 
also to set prices on outputs and to redistribute income among firms in 
a given sector (Voszka 1995; see also Canning and Hare 1994). 
These efforts to "renationalize" state-owned enterprises set the stage for 
a shift in governmental policies in the direction of promoting domestic 
ownership of productive assets. The first signs that the government was 
changing its tune came in early 1992, when the minister responsible for 
privatization called for an increase in domestic involvement in the pri­
vatization process (MTI-Econews 1992a). Statements such as these were 
followed later that year by an expansion of the E-credit program, which 
involved the provision of loans at below-market prices for the purchase 
of state enterprises. Such credits were initially restricted to individuals 
participating in the first "self-privatization" program of 1991, which had 
involved the sale of a few hundred small and medium-sized enterprises. 
In January 1992, however, ceilings on the amount of money that could 
be loaned were scrapped, allowing domestic parties to use these credits 
to purchase large as well as small enterprises.12 The circle of those eligible 
to participate in the program was also widened to include workers and 
managers who wished to purchase firms through employee stock-own­
12 B uyers had to provide 2% of the purchase price of firms up to 5 million forints 
(equal to the equivalent of $60,000 at 1992 exchange rates) and 15% of the amount 
over 5 m illion forints. In the case of large firms, therefore, E-credits could be used to 
cover approximately 85% of the purchase price (MTI-Econews 19936). 
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ership programs. Foreigners, however, were excluded from the program 
(Canning and Hare 1994). Finally, in order to make the program even 
more attractive to potential buyers, the government established a three-
year grace period on the repayment of loans and lowered the interest rate 
from 20% in January 1992 to 7% by December 1992. With inflation 
running at 23% in 1992, interest rates on E-credits were negative by a 
very large margin, which in effect meant that the government was sub­
sidizing the sale of state enterprises to domestic parties (MTI-Econews 
19926). 
The government also promoted the sale of s tate-owned enterprises to 
Hungarian citizens by allowing them to purchase firms with compensation 
vouchers rather than cash. Compensation vouchers were originally given 
to individuals who had lost property during the communist period or who 
had been subjected to political persecution. By the end of 1994, l .S million 
Hungarians had been provided with vouchers with a nominal value of 
110 billion forints, or approximately 1 billion in U.S. currency at 1994 
exchange rates (MTI-Econews 1994). The problem that many of the hold­
ers of these coupons faced, however, was a lack of a ttractive investment 
opportunities. Initially, the number of firms whose shares could be pur­
chased on the Budapest Stock Exchange in exchange for coupons was 
very limited. As a result, a secondary market in compensation coupons 
developed; by the end of 1994, the market value of these coupons stood 
at less than 40% of their original face value (MTI-Econews 1994). Be­
ginning in 1993, however, the government allowed Hungarian citizens 
and ESOP organizations to purchase state enterprises with compensation 
vouchers up to a certain percentage of the purchase price, typically 
20%-40%. The government accepted these compensation vouchers at 
their face value, and, once again, foreigners were excluded from the pro­
gram (MTI-Econews 1995a). Thus, while average citizens lacked oppor­
tunities to invest their coupons profitably and foreign parties were pro­
hibited from exchanging them altogether, enterprising Hungarians were 
able to acquire state-owned firms at a considerable discount by purchasing 
coupons at less than half their nominal value on the secondary market 
and then redeeming them with the SPA at their full value. Since com­
pensation coupons did not represent real revenue, the practice of accepting 
these coupons in exchange for ownership of enterprises represented an­
other way in which the acquisition of economic assets on the part of 
Hungarian citizens was subsidized by the state. 
Table 3 displays the cumulative effects of the government's new pri­
vatization policies. Not surprisingly, the refusal to countenance the sale 
of firms in key economic sectors to multinational corporations eventually 
slowed foreign sales to a trickle. In 1993, for example, sales to foreign 
parties were the equivalent of more than a billion U.S. dollars and rep-
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TABLE 3 
REVENUES FR OM PR IVATIZATION, IN BILLIONS OF FOR INTS 
Jan-June 
Revenue 1991 1992 1993 1994 199S 1996 1997 Cumulative 
Total 31.4 74.3 173.8 130.3 474.0 158.0 119.6 1,162.1 
Cash. 30.3 63.0 134.9 36.8 451.6 113.9 112.5 943.6 
(96.5) (84.8) (77.6) (28.2) (95.3) (72.1) (94.1) (81.2) 
Foreign 
exchange ... 24.6 41.0 110.7 12.9 412.1 77.5 83.8 763.1 
(78.3) (55.2) (63.7) (9.9) (86.9) (49.1) (70.1) (65.7) 
Forint 5.7 22.0 24.2 23.9 39.5 36.4 28.7 180.5 
(18.2) (29.6) (13.9) (18.3) (8.3) (23.0) (24.0) (15.5) 
Credit 1.0 9.1 21.7 29.3 3.9 2.4 .3 67.7 
(3.2) (12.2) (12.5) (22.5) (0.8) (1.5) (.2) (5.8) 
Compensation 
coupons 0 2.3 17.3 64.2 18.5 41.6 6.8 150.7 
(.0) (3.1) (10.0) (49.3) (3.9) (26.3) (5.7) (13.0) 
Average exchange 
rate 74.7 79.0 91.9 105.2 125.7 152.6 180.0 
NOTE.—Data are from the State Privatization and Asset Management Agency as reported in van Elkin 
(19986, p. 64). Percentage of total revenues are in parentheses. 
resented more than 60% of the SPA's revenues for that year. By 1994, 
foreign sales dropped to less than the equivalent of $1 25 million, repre­
senting only 10% of the SPA's revenues. At the same time, the subsidized 
sale of enterprises to Hungarian citizens picked up dramatically. In 1992, 
sale by means of E-credits and compensation vouchers accounted for 
slightly more than 15% of the SPA's revenues. In 1994, however, sales 
subsidized by means of such credits and coupons exceeded cash sales by 
a large margin, accounting for more than 70% of the SPA's "revenues" 
for that year. As these statistics make clear, the government had lived up 
to its promise to restrict foreign investment in favor of policies designed 
to promote the formation of a domestic bourgeoisie. By the end of 1994, 
foreign investment had dropped precipitously while the sale of firms to 
Hungarian citizens accounted for the bulk of privatization transactions. 
The response to the government's shift in policies on the part of in­
ternational agencies was swift and severe. Officials from IMF, EBRD, 
and EU condemned the failure of the Hungarian government to make 
progress on the privatization front. When these criticisms failed to bring 
about the desired results, the agencies in question cut off assistance to 
Hungary. The IMF suspended release of further tranches of aid, and the 
EBRD followed suit. As a result, Hungary's position within international 
financial markets deteriorated considerably. Its credit rating declined, 
making the cost of obtaining capital on international bond markets higher. 
In addition, its refusal to open up key economic sectors to foreign pen­
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etration was met with condemnation from EU officials (Denton 1993; 
MTI-Econews 1995a; Kornai 1997). Ultimately the policy shift proved 
unsustainable. Because Hungary remained dependent on foreign financial 
assistance, the government could ill afford to appear on the IMF's black­
list. In addition, to many Hungarians the benefits associated with flouting 
the EU's standards regarding foreign ownership did not appear to mea­
sure up to the costs associated with failure to gain membership in that 
body. During the election campaign of 1994, the Socialist Party took issue 
with the Antall government's privatization policies, promising to put an 
end to Hungary's isolation within the international community. Ironically, 
the victory of the Socialists marked a return to conformity to standards 
imposed by international agencies. 
The Final Phase, 1995-97 
The election of the Socialists to power in the fall of 199 4 marked the end 
of efforts to promote domestic ownership of firms in key economic sectors. 
The program of subsidizing sales of state-owned enterprises to Hungarian 
citizens was quickly replaced by one that reemphasized sales to foreign 
multinationals. As table 3 shows, in 1995 the E-credit and compensation 
vouchers accounted for less than 5% of privatization revenue for that 
year, down from approximately 70% in 1994.13 The decline was comple­
mented by a dramatic increase in cash sales, particularly cash sales to 
foreign parties. According to table 1, revenues from cash sales increased 
by a factor of 10 in real terms, from the equivalent of approximately $350 
million in 1994 to $3.6 billion in 1995, with sales to foreigners accounting 
for more than 90% of the total cash figure. What might have led a gov­
ernment made up largely of reformed communists to implement a set of 
policies that so clearly favored foreign capital? 
As noted above, previous efforts to promote domestic sales of state-
owned enterprises had resulted in the deterioration of Hungary's position 
within international financial circles which in turn had contributed to a 
serious downturn in the domestic economy. By the time the Socialists took 
office, real wages were falling, unemployment was above 10%, inflation 
was at 30%, the current account deficit had climbed to more than $300 
million (almost 10% of GDP), and the budget deficit exceeded 8% of GDP 
(Cottarelli 1998, pp. 13-17). The Socialists made good on their pledge to 
reverse this situation and immediately entered into negotiations with in­
13 The use of compensation vouchers increased in 1996 due to the fact that the Socialist 
government was obliged to redeem coupons issued prior to its assumption of power. 
By 1997, however, compensation vouchers once again accounted for far less than 10% 
of privatization revenues. 
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ternational lenders and the EU. Agreement was reached with the IMF 
in 1995, and the government was obliged to speed up privatization and 
to accept strict limits on the size of the budget and current account deficits 
in exchange for a new $300 million loan from the agency. The signing of 
this agreement led in turn to the release of funds from the EBRD, which 
began investing money in Hungary with renewed zeal (Marsh 1995; MTI-
Econews 19956, 1994). Finally, the Socialist government signed an agree­
ment with the EU in 1995 that committed Hungary to a set of sweeping 
reforms—particularly in regard to the privatization banks and utility com­
panies, which the previous government had resisted (OECD 1999). Crisis 
conditions, in other words, had pushed Hungary back into the arms of 
international lenders and the EU, entities that were prepared to welcome 
the country back into the fold only on the condition that it abide by 
neoliberal principles. 
Of special interest to international agencies was the privatization of the 
banking sector. From the perspective of the IMF and the EBRD, private 
ownership of financial institutions in postcommunist countries was nec­
essary in order to put an end to the type of "subterranean redistribution" 
that resulted from the tendency of state-owned banks to extend loans to 
loss-making state-owned enterprises (King 2000). According to this view, 
the Hungarian economy could not be based on market principles until 
bank privatization had been achieved. For the IMF and EU, however, 
it was not enough to force the state to divest itself of shares in Hungarian 
commercial banks; international agencies were unanimous in their call 
for the elimination of restrictions on foreign ownership of Hungarian 
financial institutions (European Commission 1995; Borish and Noel 1996; 
EBRD 1997). Since 1990, the Hungarian government had been enforcing 
a law that prohibited foreign parties from owning more than 10% of a 
given bank without special permission—and up to 1995 that permission 
had never been granted. This law was supplemented by legislation passed 
in 1992 that prohibited any single entity from owning more than 25% of 
a given bank (Lakatos 1991). Following the conclusion of negotiations 
with the EU in 1995, the Hungarian parliament repealed these restrictive 
laws and, in accordance with EU standards, passed new legislation per­
mitting unlimited foreign ownership of banks and other financial insti­
tutions, such as insurance companies and mutual funds (van Elkin 1998a). 
Foreign intervention in the privatization of the banking sector was not 
limited, however, to the elimination of legal restrictions on foreign own­
ership. Following the repeal of the laws in question, international lending 
agencies such as the EBRD began to intervene directly in the privatization 
of banks. Over the course of 1995, for example, the EBRD purchased 
minority ownership stakes in five of Hungary's six main commercial 
banks. The purpose of this action was twofold: first, to inject capital for 
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use in restructuring the banks' operations, and second, to send a signal 
to potential investors that the reform of the banking sector was proceeding 
as planned (European Report 1997; Robinson 1997). The strategy worked. 
By 1997, all but one of Hungary's commercial banks had been privatized, 
with majority ownership rights passing into the hands of large European 
financial establishments (EBRD 1998; van Elkin 1998a). Largely as a 
result of i nternational pressure, Hungary became the first country within 
the former Soviet bloc to put banking practices on an entirely new footing. 
The privatization of t elecommunication and energy firms followed the 
same pattern. International lending agencies and the EU demanded the 
elimination of restrictions on foreign ownership of firms in these sectors. 
Upon conclusion of negotiations with the IMF and the EU in 199S, the 
government removed state-owned telecommunications and energy com­
panies from the list of firms to remain under long-term state ownership. 
Massive loans from the EBRD and the World Bank quickly materialized 
to modernize these sectors and to attract additional foreign investors; not 
surprisingly, foreign capital came pouring in. In 1995 alone, foreign multi­
nationals invested $2 billion in Hungarian energy companies, acquiring 
majority ownership rights over all of Hungary's electricity producers and 
distributors and all of Hungary's gas distributors as well as minority 
ownership rights in MOL, Hungary's state-owned gas producer. In ad­
dition, two multinationals acquired controlling interest in MATAV, t he 
state-owned telecommunications company that in and of itself accounted 
for more the 3% of the country's GDP (Financial Times 1997, 1999). 
The statistics presented in table 4 underscore the extent to which foreign 
multinationals came to occupy many of the Hungarian economy's "com­
manding heights." The table displays majority ownership of firms in the 
following sectors—energy, telecommunications, finance, and basic indus­
try—that were placed into the category of long-term state ownership in 
1992. Despite the intentions of state officials to retain control over firms 
in these sectors, by 1999 foreign multinationals had assumed control of 
two-thirds of the enterprises. This development is in line with estimates 
that, by the late 1990s, foreign capital controlled two-thirds of the eco­
nomic assets in the manufacturing sector, 90% in telecommunications, 
60% in energy production and distribution, and 70% in finance (MTI-
Econews 1997d). Within 10 years of the collapse of state socialism, in 
other words, control of key sectors of the economy had been ceded to 
foreign multinationals. 
Given the fact that pressures applied by international agencies had 
largely eliminated restrictions on foreign ownership by 1997, it would be 
easy to describe changes to the property rights structure in Hungary in 
terms of progressive conformity to internationally imposed standards. 
Such an interpretation would overlook, however, the significance of earlier 
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TABLE 4 
OWNERSHIP OF FIRMS PLA CED INT O PERMAN ENT STATE OWNERS HIP (INDUSTRIAL 
FIRMS, FIRMS IN ENERGY SECTOR, AND BANKS ONL Y), 1 999 
MAJORITY OW NER 
Joint Foreign 
SECTOR N o f Firms State Foreign Domestic and Domestic 
Industry 12 2 7 2 1 
Energy 7 1 6 0 0 
Banking 7 2 5 0 0 
Telecommunications ... 1 1 0 0 
Total 27 S 19 2 1 
NOTE.—Data are from company reports and business press. 
property rights actions on the part of the state. Not only did government 
officials in Hungary maintain barriers to foreign investment for much of 
the 1990s, they also adopted, at considerable cost in terms of their standing 
in the international financial community, policies that subsidized the sale 
of state-owned assets to domestic parties. Although these policies were 
only in effect for a few years, they were nevertheless applied extensively 
enough to have fostered the emergence of a class of domestic owners. 
Furthermore, because ownership rights were in many instances trans­
ferred to enterprise insiders, the ranks of these owners included many 
individuals with a detailed understanding of the challenges their firms 
faced in finding a niche in regional and global markets. Although it is 
still too early to determine the extent to which the channeling of ownership 
rights to Hungarian nationals has fostered local capital accumulation, it 
seems reasonable to argue that the privatization policies pursued by gov­
ernment officials in Hungary kept open lines of development that would 
have been closed had the market-driven approach favored by interna­
tional agencies been implemented, particularly since, as many observers 
have noted, the shock-therapy approach toward privatization would in 
all likelihood have led to the exit of a large number of viable firms from 
the market (Leijonhufvud and Riihl 1997; King 2002). The fact that state 
actors in Hungary ultimately conceded to the demands of international 
agencies should therefore not be allowed to obscure their efforts to shape 
the development of the domestic economy through their property rights 
actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Evolutionary accounts of property transformation in postcommunist Hun­
gary have ignored evidence of the rapid diffusion of private ownership 
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rights in Hungary. As our empirical analysis has shown, since the collapse 
of state socialism in 1989 Hungary has witnessed not a blurring of the 
distinction between state and private ownership but a transition from 
state to private ownership. We explain this transition by calling attention 
to two developments that have been ignored in most sociological accounts 
of p roperty transformation in Hungary. First, state actors in that country 
actively promoted the emergence of a domestic ownership class by sub-, 
sidizing the sale of state-owned enterprises to Hungarians. Second, a mas­
sive amount of direct foreign investment has entered Hungary over the 
past 10 years, particularly after 1995 when the government implemented 
a stabilization package that eliminated many restrictions on direct foreign 
investment. Taken together, these two developments have placed own­
ership of a large majority of medium-sized to large enterprises in the 
hands of clearly identifiable private parties. Capitalism in Hungary is 
being made, in other words, with rather than without capitalists. 
Drawing on insights from comparative political economy, we explain 
the diffusion of private ownership rights in Hungary, and in particular 
the distribution of these rights between foreign and domestic parties, in 
terms of a contest between the state and international agencies over the 
course of economic development in Hungary. Evolutionary accounts have 
had little to say about the role of the state and international agencies in 
property transformation, emphasizing instead the manner in which local 
actors, particularly enterprise directors, constructed new institutions on 
the basis of routines and practices dating back to the state-socialist period. 
We argue, however, that a theoretical approach that fails to put the state 
and supra-state agencies at the center of the analysis cannot possibly 
explain the transformation of ownership rights in Hungary. As our anal­
ysis has shown, state actors in Hungary resisted pressures to allow foreign 
capital free sway in the country by maintaining barriers to FDI and 
subsidizing the sale of s tate enterprises to domestic parties. Because of 
these efforts a very substantial proportion of formerly state-owned en­
terprises were in the hands of Hungarian citizens by the late 1990s. Ul­
timately, however, pressures applied by a host of international agencies 
combined with deteriorating economic conditions forced government of­
ficials in Hungary to abandon these efforts. The subsidized sale of state 
enterprises to Hungarian nationals came to a halt, barriers to FDI were 
lifted, and foreign capital came to control most of the Hungarian econ­
omy's commanding heights. 
On the surface, these developments appear to confirm the arguments 
of competition state theorists. After all, the agreements into which Hun­
gary has entered with international agencies such as the IMF and EU 
rule out recourse to a broad range of policy options on which states have 
historically relied to influence economic activities. Despite considerable 
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evidence of conformity with neoliberal principles on the part of govern­
ment officials in Hungary, we nevertheless insist that the competition state 
perspective cannot be usefully applied to property transformations in that 
country. Contrary to the expectations of theorists in the competition state 
camp, government officials in Hungary did not play the role of "suitors" 
of foreign capital but instead enforced for a number of years policies that 
were decidedly unfriendly toward foreign multinationals seeking entry 
into the country. The property rights actions of s tate actors in Hungary 
are much better explained, we argue, from the developmental state per­
spective. While there is no doubt that the Hungarian state has experienced 
considerable erosion in its ability to influence economic activities since 
becoming integrated into world markets, the analysis presented here has 
demonstrated that government officials in that country retained significant 
capacity to shape economic developments through the allocation of own­
ership rights over state enterprises. Although it is still too early to deter­
mine with any precision the economic impact of these actions, it is not 
unreasonable to argue that the channeling of assets to Hungarian nationals 
has resulted in higher rates of domestic capital accumulation than would 
have been obtained had the shock-therapy approach to privatization been 
fully implemented. Thus we maintain that, even though they were forced 
in the long run to adopt the neoliberal formulas put forward by inter­
national agencies, state actors in Hungary were nevertheless able to affect 
in a durable way the integration of t heir country into the world economy 
through their property rights actions. 
Up to now, researchers studying postcommunist Eastern Europe have 
generally rejected the developmental state approach either on the grounds 
that control of economic assets has devolved to local actors or that in­
ternational agencies have imposed constraints on government officials that 
rule out effective economic intervention on the part of the state. Both of 
these arguments emphasize the organizational weakness of postcommunist 
states in Eastern Europe and both, we argue, are misplaced. Studies that 
have highlighted the incapacity of postcommunist governments to influ­
ence economic processes have overlooked the manner in which the pri­
vatization process itself has provided state actors with new means of 
shaping economic developments. For this reason, we believe that the 
property rights framework outlined here, while not universally relevant, 
may be usefully applied to other formerly state-socialist societies, partic­
ularly those in Eastern Europe, where state actors have possessed formal 
ownership rights over the bulk of their country's productive assets and 
been under enormous pressure to open their countries up to foreign direct 
investment. Under these circumstances, we expect that state actors in 
such countries as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia have followed 
the lead of their counterparts in Hungary in relying greatly on property 
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rights actions to further developmental goals. In short, we believe that 
Hungary is not an isolated case and that a proper emphasis on the property 
rights actions of government officials in postcommunist societies would 
lead researchers to recognize that the state continues to play a leading 
role in processes of capital accumulation in such societies despite the 
efforts of international organizations to limit its economic role. 
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